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Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards
MargaretMoses*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Arbitration is a private system of justice, made possible by the
parties' consent.' Once parties have agreed to arbitrate, their arbitration
agreement must be enforced according to its terms, just like any other
2
contract. In the United States, a court's ability to interfere with this
private adjudicatory process or to set aside an arbitral award has been
severely limited by the United States Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").3
Because an arbitration award is not easily overturned,4 parties
sometimes harbor fears that a maverick arbitrator will render an
egregious award, which cannot be challenged even though wrong on the
facts and the law.5 In the past few years, parties to arbitrations held in
the United States have sometimes, by mutual agreement, asked for
judicial review of an award for errors of law or fact-similar to judicial
review of an administrative agency decision.6 Such an expanded judicial
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. This research was
supported by a grant from the Loyola University Chicago Internal Research Awards Program. The
author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Professors Christopher R. Drahozal and Michael J.
Zimmer.
1. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989).
2. Id. at 478; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985); H.R. REP. No.
68-96, at 1 (1924).
3. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (stating four grounds for vacating an award).
4. In this Article, the terms "overturn," "vacate," "set aside," and "annul" will be used
interchangeably.
5. For some examples of arbitrator excess, enforced by the courts, see Stephen P. Younger,
Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REv. 241,
248-53 (1999). Mr. Younger expressed concern that "arbitration poses a danger of an excessive or
irrational award which cannot, in the vast majority of cases, be set aside on appeal." Id. at 253.
Professor Christopher Drahozal refers to parties' fears of "knucklehead awards," or 'roll-the dice'
or 'Russian roulette' arbitration," citing respectively Carroll E. Neesemann, Contractingfor Judicial
Review, 5 DIsp. RESOL. MAG. 18, 18 (1998), and Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct
Error-An Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 103, 104 (1997). Standardsfor
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards in the United States: Mandatory Rules or Default Rules?, 16
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 27, 28 (2001).
6. E.g., Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Teleeomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Syncor
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review of an arbitral award exceeds the usual role of the courts in the
arbitration process, and goes beyond the parameters of the FAA, which
does not provide for setting aside an award on errors of fact or law.
Rather, the FAA grounds for setting aside awards are limited to narrow,
procedural grounds, essentially to abuse of the arbitral process.7 When
the FAA was adopted in 1925, these very restrictive grounds were
specifically intended by Congress to limit a court's ability to interfere
with the arbitral process, and "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. 8
The question raised by expanded judicial review is whether the
parties have the right, by agreement, to expand the grounds on which a
court can review an arbitral award. The answer depends on the proper
interpretation of the FAA. Are the FAA grounds for review merely
default rules, which the parties can contract around, or do they establish
mandatory minimum grounds for review but permit the parties to
contract for more review? Or, are the FAA rules mandatory and
exclusive, thereby prohibiting courts from reviewing an award on any
grounds other than the narrow grounds listed in the statute?9 In the
United States, courts have answered these questions quite differently,

Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 99-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished
opinion); Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). In his concurrence in LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th
Cir. 1997), affid in part, vacated in part, remanded in part, 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), Judge
Kozinski noted that even though reviewing an arbitration award on the merits is different work from
conducting a trial, it is not different from the review that district courts perform in appeals from
administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts, or on habeas corpus.
7. Under the FAA, a court may annul an award for the following reasons:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced;
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10. Courts have, however, created an additional ground for annulment where an
arbitrator has "manifestly disregarded the law." See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
8. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
9. Courts opposing expanded judicial review tend to characterize the statutory standards as
mandatory, at least to the extent that an alternate rule "conflicts with federal policies furthered by the
FAA." Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001). There are, however,
non-statutory standards of review under the FAA that have been developed over time by judges. See
JACK J. COE, JR.,

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:

AMERICAN

PRINCIPLES AND

PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 303-06 (1997) (discussing several non-statutory theories of

vacatur, including violation of public policy, arbitrary and capricious award, and manifest disregard
of the law).
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creating a split in the circuits yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
Commentators are also divided.' 0
This Article will focus on the various policies behind the two
different interpretations of the FAA's grounds for review. It concludes
that while both positions raise important questions, the better
interpretation of the FAA permits expanded judicial review. However,
that does not end the analysis. From a practical perspective, until the
Supreme Court resolves the issue, and even if it decides that the FAA
permits expanded judicial review, there are a number of pitfalls that
parties need to consider before they seek expanded judicial review of
domestic or international arbitral awards."
Part II will consider the conflicting circuit court positions regarding
the proper scope of judicial review under the FAA, with an analysis of
the rationales supporting each position. Part III will then examine
domestic enforcement issues which arise when parties have agreed to
expanded judicial review, including different approaches which may be
taken by state and federal courts. Part IV will consider the complexities
of international enforcement of arbitral awards, particularly the tendency
of some courts to enforce awards even though they have been vacated in
the place where made, and will focus on problems of enforcement
internationally when expanded review has been sought. The Article
concludes that even though the better legal arguments support expanded
judicial review, the practical problems with enforcement of awards
10. See, e.g., Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in
Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1998) (favoring expanded judicial review);
Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of ContractualExpansion and Limitation of JudicialReview of
Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 337 (2000) (opposing expanded judicial review);
Laurence Franc, Contractual Modification of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: The French
Position, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 215 (1999) (opposing expanded judicial review); William H.
Knull, Il & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on InternationalArbitration: Is it Time to Offer an
Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531 (2000) (discussing disadvantages of expanded judicial
review and favoring arbitral appellate review); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration
Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 225 (1997) (favoring expanded judicial review); Karon A. Sasser,
Freedom to Contractfor Expanded Judicial Review in ArbitrationAgreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV.
337 (2001) (favoring expanded judicial review); Hans Smit, ContractualModification of the Scope
of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 147 (1997) (opposing expanded
judicial review); Younger, supranote 5 (favoring expanded judicial review).
11. Most of the cases in which American courts have focused on the issue of expanded review
have been cases involving only domestic parties, although Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-BacheTrade
Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), involved a Japanese party (Kyocera), and Fils et Cables
d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appears to
involve a French party. The courts have not indicated that under the FAA it makes any difference
for purposes of narrow judicial review of an award made in the United States whether the parties are
foreign or not, or whether the arbitration is considered a domestic or a non-domestic arbitration. In
either case, a party has the right to challenge the award under the FAA, or, if the forum court agrees,
to obtain expanded judicial review in accordance with the agreement of the parties.
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subjected to expanded judicial review remain significant. Parties to
domestic or international arbitrations held in the United States should
exercise great caution, and should only agree to seek expanded judicial
review of their arbitral award if they are fully aware of the enforcement
issues. They should also provide in their arbitration agreements, to the
extent possible, a means for ensuring that enforcement decisions will not
undercut what they intended to accomplish with expanded judicial
review.
II. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS: PARTIES'
CHOICE OR STATUTORY RULE?
A number of courts in the United States have enforced agreements to
have arbitral awards reviewed on the merits.12 In seeking expanded
judicial review of an award, parties have asked for either review of errors
of law 13 or of both law and fact.' 4 In Lapine Technology Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 5 for example, the arbitration clause provided that "It]he
Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of
the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the
arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or
(iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous."' 16 The
parties' underlying assumption in this clause was that the court would
enforce the arbitration agreement by reviewing any arbitral award not
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit, in Roadway Package System,
Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (2000), held that "parties may opt out of the FAA's off-the-rack vacatur
standards and fashion their own (including by referencing state law standards)," id. at 293. The
court was not dealing with expanded judicial review, however, but rather with the question of how
clearly parties needed to indicate their intent to opt out of FAA standards in favor of state law
standards.
13. See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995)
(discussing an agreement which dictated that "'[tihe arbitration decision shall be final and binding
on both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal'); Syncor Int'l Corp. v.
McLeland, No. 99-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at **6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (discussing an agreement
which dictated that .. [t]he arbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal
reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected by judicial review for any such error"').
14. See the arbitration agreement in Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.,
584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), in which the parties agreed that:
[ulpon an application to the court for an order confirming said award, the court shall have
the power to review (1)whether the findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator are, on the
entire record of said arbitration proceedings, supported by substantial evidence, and (2)
whether as a matter of law based on said findings of fact the award should be affirmed,
modified or vacated. Upon such determination, judgment shall be entered in favor of
either party consistent therewith.
Id. at 242.
15. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
16. Id. at 887.
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only in accordance with the narrow standards of the FAA, but also on the
facts and the law.
18
Two circuit courts-the Fifth Circuit17 and the Fourth Circuit have enforced the parties' agreement for expanded judicial review of an
arbitration award. The Tenth Circuit,' 9 on the other hand, has refused to
do so, and the Eighth Circuit 2° has indicated in dicta that it is unlikely to
permit such review. The Ninth Circuit, which had lined up with the Fifth
Circuit in its decision in LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,21
recently did an unexpected flip-flop in an en banc decision, Kyocera v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services Inc.,22 reversing its position on
expanded judicial review, and ending up in the Tenth Circuit's camp.
This split of opinion in the circuit courts will undoubtedly continue
until resolved by the Supreme Court. Thus, parties that want expanded
grounds of review of their awards would do well to ensure that their
arbitration and any enforcement action takes place in one of the
complying circuits. Nonetheless, until the question is resolved by the
Supreme Court, parties will not know for certain whether their request
for review on the merits will be honored, or whether the Supreme Court
will, at some point prior to such review, limit it to existing narrow
statutory and non-statutory grounds for vacating an award.2 3
There are legitimate policy grounds supporting both sides of this
issue, which makes a Supreme Court decision on this point difficult to
predict. Courts and commentators who favor permitting expansion of the
grounds on which a court may act in reviewing an arbitral award
emphasize freedom of contract, noting that one of the principal selling
points of the arbitration process is that parties can "tailor the scope of
17. Gateway Techs., 64 F.3d at 996.
18. Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 99-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at **6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1997).
19. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001).
20. UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
with favor the LaPine dissent, 130 F.3d at 891, and stating that "we do not believe it is yet a
foregone conclusion that parties may effectively agree to compel a federal court to cast aside
sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA").
21. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part,vacated in part,remanded in part, 341 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2003). A number of cases involving multiple parties, including, in addition to the parties
named above, Prudential-Bache Trade Services Inc., Prudential Capital and Investment Services,
Inc., and LaPine Holding Co., were consolidated in this action.
22. 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003). This case will hereinafter be referred to as Kyocera, while
the three judge panel decision it vacated in part will be referred to as LaPine. The change of position
was unexpected, to say the least, since the en banc panel in Kyocera, during an appeal of a second
three judge panel decision in the same case, reached back to the first panel decision from six years
before (LaPine), partially vacated it, and reinstated a district court decision from eight years before.
23. For examples of non-statutory grounds, see COE, supra note 9, at 303-06.
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'arbitrable issues' to fit their own particular needs, circumstances, or
desires., 24 This view holds that under the FAA, a provision for
expanded judicial review is part of a private agreement to arbitrate,
which the FAA requires to be enforced according to its terms. 25 The
Fifth Circuit found that the limited FAA grounds for vacatur of an
arbitral award are essentially default grounds, which the parties are free
to contract around.26
[T]he FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not operate without regard
to the wishes of the contracting parties ....It does not follow that the
FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under
different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a
result would be quite inimical to the FAA's purpose of ensuring that
private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.
Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and
parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as
they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they
will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which
that arbitration will be conducted.27

The Fifth Circuit thus focused on the FAA's grounds for review as a
default standard, and relied upon Congress' and the Supreme Court's
strong pro-arbitration views as support for upholding the parties'
agreement for expanded judicial review.28
Commentators and courts which oppose expanded judicial review of
arbitral awards assert that the FAA does not permit expanded judicial
review. They further claim that expanded review would obliterate the
distinction between arbitration and litigation, thereby destroying the
great advantage of arbitration, which is to provide a speedy and efficient
process for completing the "adjudication of disputes in a single
instance.,
24.

29

In Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,30 the Tenth Circuit, which

Rau, supra note 10, at 234.

25. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995).
26. Id. at 997 ("Because these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review, their
contractual provision supplements the FAA's default standard of review and allows for de novo
review of issues of law embodied in the arbitration award.").
27. Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995), which
was quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489
U.S. 468,479 (1989)).
28. Gateway Techs., 64 F.3d at 996-97 (discussing the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration
holdings); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 99-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at **7 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1997).
29. Smit, supra note 10, at 147-48.
30. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
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was the first circuit court to hold against expanded judicial review,
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit decision in LaPine
on two fundamental grounds. First, the Tenth Circuit asserted that
parties do not have the power to determine the scope of judicial review.
Second, it found that the FAA's grounds of review are mandatory, based
on important policies underlying the FAA.32
With regard to party empowerment, the court rejected any right by
parties to dictate to courts the scope of review, noting that "parties may
not force reviewing courts to apply unfamiliar rules and procedures., 33 It
further noted that "the purposes behind the FAA, as well as the principles
announced in various Supreme Court cases, do not support a rule
' 34
allowing parties to alter the judicial process by private contract.
According to the Tenth Circuit, none of the Supreme Court's decisions
on arbitration state that parties "are free to interfere with the judicial
process. 35 In other words, parties cannot tell courts what to do. The
court emphasized its position in a footnote, where it reiterated, "we hold
that, in the absence of clear authority to the contrary, parties may not
interfere with the judicial process by dictating how the federal courts
operate. 36
More fundamentally, the Tenth Circuit concluded that expanded
judicial review was impermissible under the FAA. Unlike the Fifth
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit LaPine decision, the Tenth Circuit in
Bowen concluded that the FAA is more than a collection of default
rules.37 It held instead that FAA standards are mandatory if the alternate
rule would conflict with federal policies furthered by the FAA.
The
court then determined that a party-agreed expansion of judicial review of
arbitral awards was an alternate rule that would conflict with the policies
of the FAA. 3 9 Those policies, according to the court, are to limit
31. Id. at 934 ("no authority clearly allows private parties to determine how federal courts
review arbitration awards").
32. Id. at 935.
33. Id. at 935-36. The Court also cites dicta which appears to support its position, such as
Judge Posner's statement in Chicago TypographicalUnion No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935
F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991), that "if parties desire broader appellate review, 'they can
contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award."' Bowen, 254 F.3d at
934. It also expressly noted that "[iun dicta, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have expressed
disapproval of contractually expanded standards of review." Id. at 936.
34. Id. at 933.
35. Id. at 934.
36. See id. at 936-37 n.8 (explaining why the court did not decide whether contractually
created standards of review create federal jurisdiction).
37. Id. at 935.
38. Id. at 934-35.
39. Id. at 935.
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statutory standards for reviewing an arbitral award, in order to "further
the federal policy of favoring arbitration by preserving the independence
of the arbitration process., 40 Thus, according to the court, the FAA's
narrow standards for review of an arbitral award are mandatory because
they support the important policy of independence of arbitration from
interference by the court.4 '
The Tenth Circuit relied on statements by the Supreme Court in
earlier cases for support of its position, as well as legislative intent
presumed from statutory language. It cited, for example, the statement
from the Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University42 that
"[e]nforcing the parties' contract therefore '[gave] effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties without doing violence
to the policies behind... [t]he FAA."4' The Tenth Circuit then asserted
that expanded judicial review, unlike the issue in Volt, "threatens to
undermine the policies behind the FAA." 44 But the policies referred to
by the Supreme Court in Volt were simply the policies of enforcing the
parties' agreement as written. In Volt, the parties had chosen California
law as the governing law, and the Supreme Court affirmed a California
Court of Appeal decision that such a choice included California
arbitration rules, rather than the FAA.4 5 Using the California rules,
pursuant to the parties' choice, did not, in the Court's view, do violence
to the policies of the FAA, which were to ensure that6rivate agreements
to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. 6 Those policies
appear to support expanded judicial review as the parties' choice, and
would seem to be undermined by a refusal to enforce the parties'
agreement. Thus, there does not appear to be support in Volt for the
Tenth Circuit's position.
The Tenth Circuit's reliance on a second Supreme Court case also
seems misplaced. It cited Southland Corp. v. Keating4 7 for the position
that when state laws contravene the policies behind the FAA, those laws
are pre-empted by the FAA.48 While true, this does not support the
Tenth Circuit's position that expanded judicial review violates policies of
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
See id. (stating that the FAA's limited review ensures judicial respect for arbitration).
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
Id. at 935.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 472-73.
Id. at 479.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-35.
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the FAA. In fact, the same point in Southland-that state laws are preempted when in violation of FAA policies-was cited by the Supreme
Court in Volt as being necessary to uphold Congress's principal purpose
of ensuring that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to
their terms. 49 Thus, the point of the Supreme Court's holding in
Southland was to enforce the parties' choice in accordance with
congressional intent.
The Tenth Circuit did not deal with the possibility that the policy it
relied on-independence of the arbitration process-may be in direct
conflict with the primary concern of Congress-that courts should
enforce the parties' agreement according to its terms. The conflict
occurs because if a court denies expanded judicial review in order to
preserve the independence of the arbitral process, the parties' agreement
will not be enforced according to its terms. In another context, when two
goals of the FAA were said to conflict, the Supreme Court had no
hesitation in finding that enforcement of the parties' agreement trumped
the competing goal. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,50 the Court
held that state claims should be arbitrated even though federal claims
would be litigated separately, rejecting the argument that bifurcated
proceedings would thwart the FAA's goal of speedy and efficient
decision making.5 '
We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict
between two goals of the Arbitration Act-enforcement of private
agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute
resolution-must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to realize
the intent of the drafters. The preeminent concern of Congress in
passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties
had entered, and that concern requires that [courts] rigorously enforce

agreements to arbitrate .... 5 2

Thus, even though the policy of independence of the arbitral process may
well be an important goal of the Act, there is no authority for finding that
it takes precedence over the goal of enforcement of private agreements,
which is the preeminent concern of Congress.
The Tenth Circuit's finding that the grounds for review under the
FAA are mandatory is also problematic in light of congressional intent
49.
50.
51.
52.

Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
Id. at 217, 219.
Id. at 221.
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that arbitration agreements under the FAA are to be "placed upon the
same footing as other contracts. 53 Contracts scholars assert that
mandatory rules "'are justifiable only to the extent the restriction on
contractual freedom is needed to protect (1) parties within the contract,
or (2) parties outside the contract."' 54 The Tenth Circuit's finding that
the FAA grounds for review are mandatory does not appear necessary to
protect the parties within the contract, who have chosen expanded
review, or any third parties. If an arbitration agreement is to be treated
the same as other contracts, as Congress intended, courts should respect
the parties' choice, absent justifiable reasons for restrictions.
Curiously, although the Tenth Circuit asserted various rationales in
support of limiting federal review of an arbitration agreement to the
grounds set forth in the FAA, the court accepted without question
judicially created exceptions to the FAA's statutory grounds, such as
"the manifest disregard of the law" standard for vacating an award.
After holding that the "parties may not contract for expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards," the court announced that it would review
the arbitration award "under the FAA and 'manifest disregard of justice'
standards.
Despite noting that Congress, through the FAA, provided
"explicit guidance regarding judicial standards of review, 5 6 the court, by
applying an additional, judicially created exception to that "explicit
guidance," undercuts its position that the FAA's statutory grounds for
review were intended to be mandatory. Apparently, the court views the
grounds in the statute as mandatory for parties, but not for judges.
With respect to the language of the statute, the court noted that
although section 4 of the FAA allows parties to seek an order from the
court compelling arbitration "in the manner provided for in [the]
agreement," there is no similar language in sections 10 and 11 requiring
district courts to follow parties' agreements in confirming or vacating
awards.5 7 The argument, which is essentially that Congress did not
intend for courts to comply with parties' agreements as to grounds for
judicial review of an award, is not persuasive in light of the legislative
53. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
54. Drahozal, supra note 5, at 28 (quoting Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts,
in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585, 586 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998)).
55. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001). The Bowen court
explained that manifest disregard of the law means "the arbitrators knew the law and explicitly
disregarded it." Id. at 932 (citing Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 240 (1st Cir.
1995)).
56. Id. at 934.
57. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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history of the FAA. The legislative concern at the time the FAA was
adopted was to prevent undue interference by the courts, which were
refusing to enforce the parties' agreements.58 Given the context of such
judicial hostility to arbitration, one would not expect the legislators in
1925 to envision that parties would agree to additional participation by
the courts to review the arbitral result. This does not mean, however,
that Congress intended to prohibit the parties from making such an
agreement.
The FAA was designed "to overrule the judiciary's
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate ' 59 and to require
courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other
contracts, in accordance with their terms. 60 Because nothing in the FAA
limits parties' ability to agree that they want broader judicial review of
their arbitral award than that provided in the FAA, the Tenth Circuit's
position is not persuasive.
The Tenth Circuit attempted to justify its restriction on the parties'
freedom of contract by asserting that parties simply do not have the
power to tell courts what to do. The court asserted that this is a different
question from whether there is jurisdiction for parties to seek expanded
review. 61 It claimed that the Seventh Circuit in dicta, in Chicago
Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun Times,62 disapproved of
contractually expanded judicial review, because "federal jurisdiction
cannot be created by contract., 63 Although the Tenth Circuit appeared
sympathetic to the Seventh Circuit's position, it stated that it would not
rule on jurisdictional grounds because of its holding that "in the absence
of clear authority to the contrary, parties may not interfere with the
judicial process by dictating how the federal courts operate. ' 64
It may be that the court declined to assert a lack of jurisdiction
because the argument was weak. If there is a ground of federal
jurisdiction, such as diversity, such jurisdiction should permit courts to
enforce the parties' agreement. 65 As the Ninth Circuit noted in LaPine,
58. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
59. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) (citing H.R. REP. No.
68-96, at 1 (1924)).
60. id. at 219.
61. Bowven, 254 F.3d at 936-37 n.8.
62. 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). Any reliance on this case, even as dicta, is surprising,
since it did not involve the FAA. The arbitration was pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
under § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act. Moreover, the parties had not agreed to seek
expanded judicial review.
63. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936-37 n.8 (quoting Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago
Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991)).
64. Id.
65. If the federal court had jurisdiction to provide narrow judicial review, it would clearly have
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"an arbitration issue would not be in the federal courts at all were it not
for the fact that they would have jurisdiction over and the obligation to
decide the whole matter in the absence of arbitration. 66 If the argument
is that there is no jurisdiction to review the award on grounds other than
the FAA's statutory grounds, one would think that same argument would
exclude the judicially created ground of "manifest disregard of the law."
Moreover, even assuming an absence of authority to review an arbitral
award on the merits because of a lack of statutory authority, in
appropriate circumstances, parties can consent to a court's act that is in
excess of its statutory authority.67
Although the Tenth Circuit's decision seems at times almost
disingenuous, and not well supported by the law cited, the recent en banc
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Kyocera, vacating LaPine, makes no new
arguments in opposition to expanded judicial review. 68 Much of the
court's opinion is an attempt to justify its decision to vacate a three-judge
panel decision made six years earlier, on an issue which the parties did
not present to the en banc panel for review. 6' The court's rehearing en
banc of the panel decision permitting expanded judicial review was not
only highly unusual, but, according to Judges Rymer and Trott, in a
separate statement, improvidently granted because the issue "is not
dispositive, does not matter to the parties, was not identified as an issue
on appeal, was not thoroughly vented in oral or written argument, is not
inconsistent
with Ninth Circuit precedent, and does not resolve a circuit
70
split.
The Ninth Circuit put forth only two reasons for reversing the sixyear old panel decision that had permitted expanded judicial review.
First, it asserted that Congress intended to preclude more expansive
review to preserve speed and flexibility.71 While Congress may have
intended to preserve speed and flexibility under the FAA, this does not
establish that it intended to preclude expanded judicial review if it was
a jurisdictional basis for expanded review. However, the FAA itself is considered a regulation of
commerce and does not confer federal jurisdiction. Any case properly in the district court under the
Federal Arbitration Act must have an independent jurisdictional basis. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2002)
(providing that independent federal jurisdiction is required when a party seeks to have a federal court
enforce its arbitration agreement).
66. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997), affd in part,
vacated in part, remanded in part, 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
67. Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 823-26 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (Nott, J., dissenting).
68. 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
69. See id. at 994-98.
70. See id. at 1006.
71. See id. at 998.
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sought by the parties in their arbitration agreement, or even that Congress
ever foresaw the possibility. Preserving speed and flexibility was not the
primary intent of Congress.72 The Ninth Circuit ignores the critical fact
that at the time the FAA was passed, Congress's primary intent was to
prevent courts from thwarting the parties' arbitration agreement in order
that agreements to arbitrate would be enforced according to their terms
just like any other contract.7 3 Where there is a conflict of goals between
(1) speed and flexibility and (2) enforcing the parties' agreement
according to its terms, the Supreme Court, as noted earlier, has had no
hesitation in finding that enforcement of the parties' agreement trumped
efficiency, since "[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the
Act was to enforce private agreements. 74
The Ninth Circuit's only other argument was simply that parties
cannot tell courts what to do. [B]ecause Congress has specified
standards for confirming an arbitration award, federal courts must act
pursuant to those standards and not others. Private parties' freedom to
fashion their own arbitration process has no bearing whatsoever on their
inability to amend the statutorily prescribed standards governing federal
court review. Even when Congress is silent on the matter, private parties
lack the power to dictate how the federal courts conduct the business of
resolving disputes.75
The cases the Ninth Circuit cites as support for its position that
parties cannot contract for expanded judicial review provide little
comfort. Like the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit refers to "standards"
rather than "grounds" for review. 76 The Ninth Circuit then cites to cases
that say parties cannot make the decision for the courts as to whether a
plain error, abuse of discretion standard or a de novo standard of review
applies.7 7 These are not, however, the standards used when a district
court reviews an arbitral award. That standard of review, according to
most courts, including the Ninth Circuit,78 is "extremely narrow and
exceedingly deferential. 79 The reason it is extremely narrow and
deferential, according to the Supreme Court, is because the parties "have
72. See text accompanying notes 46-52.
73. See text accompanying notes 46-52.
74. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
75. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000.
76. Id.
77. See id. (citing K & T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996),
Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 262 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Vonsteen, 950 F.2d 1086,
1091 (5th Cir. 1992)).
78. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers Union v. UPS, 241 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
79. See Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000).
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contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator" and thus "it is the
arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they
have agreed to accept. ' 80 Thus, the scope of the standard of review is
determined by the parties' contract. It therefore follows that if the
parties change their contract to provide that the dispute will not be finally
settled by an arbitrator, there is no longer the need for a narrow and
deferential standard of review. This is not a question of parties telling
courts what to do, but of parties changing the underlying basis on which
courts make the determination of the proper standard of review.
The parties who seek expanded judicial review are not trying to
dictate to the courts the standard of review. They are simply asking the
courts to consider, as provided in the parties' arbitration agreement,
whether an arbitrator erred as to the law, or as to the law and the facts.
This is similar to what district courts do when they review decisions from
administrative agencies or bankruptcy courts. 81
By conflating
"standards" of review and "grounds" of review, both the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits are misstating the issue. It is not a question of whether parties
can dictate to the courts which standard of review applies-for example,
the plain error standard, the de novo standard or the abuse of discretion
standard. Rather, the question is whether the grounds of review in the
FAA are default grounds which the parties can contract around, as the
Fifth Circuit asserts, or are mandatory and exclusive grounds, as the
Tenth Circuit claims. In conflating "standards" and "grounds," both the
Ninth and the Tenth Circuits seem to be trying to draw attention away
from the existing judge-created grounds of review that go beyond the
statutory grounds in the FAA. While claiming that the FAA statutory
grounds are mandatory and exclusive, both the Tenth Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit acknowledge that "manifest disregard of the law is a nonstatutory ground of review," and the Ninth Circuit adds yet another nonstatutory ground, "completely irrational. 82 While one might favor
having such grounds to provide at least a small safety net against
arbitrator abuse, their existence undercuts the courts' arguments that the

80. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987). In Hawaii
Teamsters, the Ninth Circuit also notes that "[blecause the parties have contracted to have disputes
settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts
and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept." 241 F.3d at 1181.
81. In his concurring decision in LaPine, Judge Kozinski noted that even though reviewing an
arbitration award is different work from conducting a trial, it was not different from the review that
district courts perform in appeals from administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts, or on habeas
corpus. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891.
82. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003).
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FAA's statutory grounds for review of an arbitral award are mandatory
and exclusive.
Neither the Ninth nor the Tenth Circuit meets head-on the critical
issue of treating the parties' agreement like any other contract. Parties
only get to an arbitral forum by consent. When they opt for expanded
judicial review, they have, in essence, only given partial consent to
arbitration-consent to have the first, or trial stage, of their dispute
handled by an arbitrator rather than a judge. They have not consented to
have the arbitral decision become final and binding without full judicial
review on either the law, or, depending on their agreement, on both the
law and the facts. The FAA does not prohibit parties' partial consent to
arbitration.8 3 Because the FAA was passed in order to encourage
arbitration, permitting parties who otherwise would not choose to
arbitrate at all, to choose "partial arbitration" by providing for expanded
judicial review would seem to encourage arbitration. One has the
impression, however, particularly in the Ninth Circuit opinion, that the
court assumes that if parties are permitted to have expanded judicial
review, they will all opt for expanded review and therefore burden the
courts and clog court dockets. 84 But the opposite is probably more likely
to be true. First of all, not all parties will want expanded judicial review.
Many, if not most, who want to arbitrate, will prefer to have a final and
binding arbitration that is not reviewable on the facts or the law. The
benefits of speed, flexibility and informality that have already caused
many parties to choose arbitration continue to carry persuasive value.
However, for those who want expanded judicial review, and are not
permitted to have it, their most likely course of action will be to try their
entire dispute in the court system. Thus, if courts prevent parties from
having "partial arbitration" as an option, they will lose the opportunity to
have more parties choose arbitration for the very time-consuming trial
stage of the dispute resolution process.
In sum, the differing viewpoints of courts that have considered
expanded judicial review essentially express two different perspectives.
83. There is no statutory language prohibiting "partial" consent to arbitration. Whether there
can be expanded judicial review, of course, depends upon whether the grounds for review in the
statute are considered default standards, which parties can contract around, or whether they are
considered mandatory and exclusive.
84. The Ninth Circuit appeared quite concerned by the burden that would be placed on it if it
had to review the issues on which the parties sought review, which, according to the court, "would
require a detailed examination of California law and the application of that law to a factual record
spanning several years and many thousands of pages." Id. at 994. The Tenth Circuit, on the other
hand, acknowledged that "[r]eviewing an arbitration award is certainly less work than hearing the
entire case," and that "even under expanded standards of review, arbitration reduces the burden on
district courts." Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001).
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The first view holds that the parties' choice to expand judicial review is a
matter of consent just like any other part of their arbitration agreement,
and therefore entitled to enforcement under the FAA's policies favoring
enforcement of the agreement according to its terms. That means the
grounds for review found in the FAA are default grounds which can be
changed by contract of the parties. The opposing view is that the
agreement to expand judicial review is in conflict with the FAA because
it fundamentally changes the nature of the arbitral process and creates
new and different obligations for the courts, which impinge on the
intended independence of the arbitral process. That means the FAA
grounds for review are mandatory and exclusive, and parties cannot
change them by contract.
The conflicting positions of the various circuit courts represent
different approaches to interpreting the statute. The courts permitting
expanded review look at the underlying congressional intent, and find
that enforcement of the parties' agreement according to its terms is the
most important goal of the statute. The courts opposing expanded review
look only at the language of the statute, and find that the statutory
grounds are restrictive and that parties have no power to go beyond the
statute to require additional review by the court. Interestingly, the more
technical and formalistic approach of the Tenth Circuit and the recent
Ninth Circuit en banc panel appear to parallel the position of courts that,
prior to the passage of the FAA, jealously guarded their own prerogatives
by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements. Like the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, those courts did not think parties could tell courts what to do. It
took congressional action before parties to an arbitration agreement
could have some assurance that their agreement would be enforced.
Although it is difficult to predict which view of expanded judicial
review will prevail in the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit's position that
the FAA permits expanded judicial review appears more consistent with
both legislative intent and Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the
importance of enforcing arbitral agreements in accordance with their
terms. On the other hand, there are a number of reasons, which will be
discussed in the next Part, why parties and their counsel, in either a
domestic or an international arbitration held in the United States, should
be cautious about agreeing to expanded judicial review of an arbitration
award at the present time.
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III. PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT

Once an arbitral award has issued, parties may simply agree to
comply with the award.85 If payment by the losing party is not
forthcoming, however, the winning party will seek to confirm the award
in order to obtain enforcement, and the losing party may attempt to have
the award vacated. Choice of the court where enforcement or vacatur is
sought can be critical, given the split in the circuit courts over whether to
permit expanded judicial review. Parties who have agreed to expanded
judicial review should, of course, have also agreed to conduct their
arbitration within a judicial circuit that permits such review. However,
even when the parties have chosen a complying jurisdiction, the sailing
will not necessarily be smooth. This Part discusses some of the various
problems which could arise in domestic arbitrations if expanded judicial
review is sought by the parties.
The first, and perhaps most obvious problem is that the Supreme
Court could, at an inopportune moment for the arbitrating parties, come
down with a decision that essentially adopts the view of the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits-i.e., that the FAA prohibits expanded judicial review.
The effect on the parties would be to deny the judicial safety net they had
sought. Moreover, there is a risk that if a court refused to review the
award in the expanded manner agreed on by the parties, it could also
decide to invalidate the entire arbitration agreement. The basis for
invalidation would be that since the parties' consent to arbitrate
depended on having a judicial safety net, which was now unavailable,
their original consent to arbitrate was no longer valid. The Tenth Circuit
avoided that result in Bowen by noting specifically that the losing party
had "petitioned the district court to compel all claims to arbitration
before agreeing to an expanded judicial standard of review. ''86 That
meant that the agreement to have expanded judicial review was not the
basis of the agreement to arbitrate. On the other hand, if the agreement
to have expanded judicial review is contained within the original
arbitration clause, invalidation of the agreement would be quite possible.
Two California state court decisions applying state law suggest two
different paths a court might take after finding that an agreement for
expanded judicial review was not enforceable. In Crowell v. Downey
85. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 704 (2d ed. 2001)
("Many international arbitral awards do not require either judicial enforcement or confirmation,
because they are voluntarily complied with."); COE, supra note 9, at 295 ("Awards are often
complied with voluntarily.").
86. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 941.
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87 the California Court of Appeal
Community Hospital Foundation,
invalidated, under the California Arbitration Act, an arbitration
agreement that sought expanded judicial review. 88 The arbitration clause
required the arbitrator to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law
and provided for judicial review on the merits.89 Prior to beginning any
process of arbitration, Ronald Crowell, M.D., a professional corporation,
brought an action for declaratory relief against Downey Community
Hospital Foundation ("DCHF"), "seeking a judicial determination that
the arbitration agreement was 'valid and enforceable,"' and that DCHF
was obligated to arbitrate. 90 The trial court dismissed the complaint on
the grounds that the right of judicial review of the merits was not
permissible under California law and, therefore, the entire underlying
arbitration agreement was unenforceable. 9 1 Crowell argued on appeal
that the trial court had erred in not letting him sever the unenforceable
provisions of the arbitration agreement-the provisions providing for
expanded judicial review. 92 However, the Court of Appeal found no
error. In affirming the lower court's judgment, it held as follows:

[t]he provision for judicial review of the merits of the arbitration award
was so central to the arbitration agreement that it could not be severed.
To do so would be to create an entirely new agreement to which neither
party agreed.... The parties to the contract here agreed to arbitration
with judicial review of errors of law and fact. Without that provision, a
different arbitration process results. 93

In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Michael G. Nott noted that
refusing expanded judicial review and invalidating the arbitration
agreement resulted in the "worst of all worlds."
The express intent of the parties has been thwarted and, rather than
having most of the costly and time-consuming aspects of the litigation

resolved by the arbitrator with the trial court merely providing an
87. 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
88. Id. at 810.
89. The arbitration clause provided in pertinent part that
a court shall have the authority to review the transcript of the arbitration proceedings and
the arbitrator's award and shall have the authority to vacate the arbitrator's award, in
whole or in part, on the basis that the award is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based upon an error of law.
Id. at 812.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 813.
92. Id. at 817.
93. Id.
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oversight
function, the case will now be fully litigated and tried in
94
court.

A few months later, a California Court of Appeal in a different
appellate district followed Crowell in refusing to grant expanded judicial
review, but did not invalidate the entire arbitration agreement. In
95 the
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority v. CC Partners,
court specifically agreed with the primary holding in Crowell that the
court did not have the power to review questions of law decided by the
arbitrator.96 However, it did not find the arbitration agreement void and
unenforceable. Rather, it severed as unenforceable the provision for
expanded judicial review.97
In distinguishing Crowell, the Oakland-Alameda court noted that the
Crowell court was not dealing with an arbitral award, but rather the
dismissal of a complaint seeking declaratory relief.98 The OaklandAlameda court then observed that in the case before it, unlike Crowell,
there was an arbitral award, and concluded that the award could not be
vacated because the parties' "improper attempt to expand the scope of
judicial review is not among the statutory grounds for vacating an
arbitration award." 99 This is a clever argument because it focuses on
vacating the award, rather than on invalidating the underlying arbitration
agreement, which would have the effect of rendering the award void. It
thus appears consistent with the court's position that the statutory
grounds for vacating an arbitration award are exclusive. The counter
argument, however, is simply that for an arbitrator to make a valid
award, she must have the consent of the parties to arbitrate, and if that
consent is lacking because it was contingent on expanded judicial
review, then rendering an arbitration award is itself an act which exceeds
the powers of the arbitrator. An arbitrator's act in excess of her powers
is a statutory ground for vacating an award. 1°0
The Oakland-Alameda court next distinguished Crowell on the
ground that in the case before it the agreement containing the arbitration
clause also contained a broad severance clause, which was not the case in
Crowell.' ' The court found the language of the severance clause
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 827.
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 371.
Id. (citing CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2).
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2000); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a)(4) (West Supp. 2003).
Oakland-Alameda, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371.
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unambiguous and the intent of the parties clear: all provisions were to be
enforced except to the extent they were invalid. 0 2 The court also relied
on principles of equity to support severance rather than voiding the entire
agreement. 0 3 However, the Oakland-Alameda court did not squarely
focus on the Crowell court's view that the agreement for expanded
judicial review could not be severed because judicial review on the
merits was integral to the parties' consent to the arbitration agreement,
that is, "[t]o [sever] would be to create an entirely new agreement to
which neither party agreed."' 4
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in its en banc decision in Kyocera, came
up against the same issue, but did not deal with the effect that severing
an expanded judicial review clause would have on the parties' consent.
The Kyocera case did not involve a situation like Bowen, where the
Tenth Circuit was able to dodge the bullet because the losing party had
petitioned to compel arbitration before the parties agreed to expanded
judicial review.' 05 Instead, the Ninth Circuit had to deal with an
arbitration agreement that included an agreement for expanded judicial
review in a matter that had begun sixteen years before, in 1987, with a
motion to compel arbitration. The arbitration award, which was issued in
1994 (1) had been affirmed in 1995 by a district court under the narrow
grounds of the FAA, (2) had been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, (3) had
been remanded to the district court to reconsider under the broader
judicial review agreed upon by the parties, (4) had been affirmed by the
district court under the expanded judicial review sought by the parties,10 6
(5) had been appealed to a second Ninth Circuit panel, which affirmed,
and (6) was now being reviewed by the en banc panel. To invalidate the
award after sixteen years of intensive effort and activity by the parties
and their counsel would have undoubtedly brought forth significant
criticism, 07 particularly when the parties never sought en banc review of
Moreover, the losing party did not appear to be
this issue.
disadvantaged, because the award had been affirmed at the district court
level under both the narrow FAA grounds and (on remand) under the
expanded judicial review grounds, and was affirmed at the appellate

102. Id.
103. Id. at 371-72.
104. Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
105. See text accompanying note 87.
106. The district court vacated only one finding of fact that did not affect the damages award.
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Srvcs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. The court noted that attorneys' fees of $14,500,000 were awarded to LaPine and Prudential
as part of the arbitration award, before any of the subsequent appeals and remands. Id. at 990 n.3.
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level under the expanded grounds, which included the narrower FAA
grounds.
Nonetheless, Kyocera argued that it would never have agreed to
arbitrate at all if expansive review were precluded, and urged the court to
invalidate the entire arbitration clause.' ° 8 Rather than determining that
the arbitration agreement need not be invalidated because Kyocera
suffered no harm, the Ninth Circuit based its decision to sever the
provision for expanded judicial review on the severability doctrine. It
turned to California law, finding that the severability of particular
contract terms is a matter of state law.1°9 However, the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on the particular California cases it cited seems misplaced. The
10
major cases, Amendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services,
Saika v. Gold,"' and Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.,' all deal with
unconscionable provisions, which courts permit to be severed unless the
provisions permeate the agreement such that it cannot be cured by the
severance.'
In Amendariz, the California Supreme Court found the
unconscionable provisions could not be severed, because the arbitration
agreement was permeated by unconscionablility." 4 In Saika, the
California Court of Appeal found unconscionable, and severed, a
provision in a doctor-patient agreement that permitted either party to
reject an arbitration award of $25,000 or greater, and to request a trial de
novo in superior court." 15 The court found this provision unconscionably
favored the doctor, even though on its face it applied to both parties. The
court did not, however, invalidate the underlying arbitration agreement,
because it was not unconscionable." 6 In Little, the California Supreme
Court severed a provision for review by a second arbitrator if an award
exceeded $50,000, because it was so one-sided as to be
unconscionable.' '7 The court found that the second proceeding was
geared toward giving the arbitral defendant, an employer, a substantial
opportunity to overturn a sizeable arbitration award, and that the award
was unlikely to be increased against the employer." 8 Although the
appeal provision was too one-sided to be enforced, the court found it
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1001.
24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000).
49 Cal. App. 4th 1074 (1996).
29Cal. 4th 1064(2003).

113.
114.

Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 124.
24 Cal. 4th 83 at 124-27.

115. 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1080.
116.

Id.

117. 29 Cal. 4th 1064 at 1073-74.
118. Id.
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could be severed from the arbitration agreement, which was not
otherwise unconscionable.
The Ninth Circuit cited Little as support for severing the expanded
judicial review clause, stating:
We also note that the Little court severed a term providing for arbitral
review of an arbitration award; if internal arbitral review was not
sufficiently central to the purpose of an arbitration process to defeat
severability, then surely the external scope of judicial review is not
sufficiently central to the arbitration clause to defeat severability.1" 9
This suggests that the Ninth Circuit completely missed the point of the
California Court's decision, which focused on fairness. The arbitral
review process was severed because it unfairly disadvantaged one party,
while the basic arbitration clause was not unfair. Therefore, severance
was possible because severing the offending clause did not affect the
underlying arbitration agreement. In Kyocera, on the other hand, neither
party, nor the court, had asserted there was any unfairness in the
expanded judicial review clause, which was a perfectly symmetrical
clause equally benefiting both parties. The decision with respect to
severance, however, should consider the impact that severing the
expanded judicial review clause has on the parties' consent to arbitration.
The point raised in Crowell, and completely ignored by the Ninth
Circuit, is that the expanded judicial review provision was central to the
arbitration agreement; without it, the parties would not have agreed to
arbitrate, and arbitration can only occur if the parties consent. For that
reason, according to the Crowell court, the expanded judicial review
provision could not be severed, because to sever it would be "to create an
neither party agreed," and cause "a
entirely new agreement to which
20
process."
arbitration
different
Although the Ninth Circuit mentioned Oakland-Alameda as a "see
also" cite, curiously, it failed to mention the other pertinent California
appellate court decision, Crowell. It also did not state whether there was
a broad severance clause in the Kyocera contract, which was one of the
ways Oakland-Alameda had distinguished Crowell.121
119. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1002.
120. Crowley, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817.
121. The reasoning in Oakland-Alamedasuggests that if parties want to preserve an award even
though expanded judicial review is denied-and they may not want this at all-they should include a
broad severance clause in their agreement. The parties may not want to preserve the award without
expanded judicial review if that was the primary reason they were willing to consent to arbitrate in
the first place.
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The Ninth Circuit's finding that severing expanded judicial review
provisions is analogous to severing unconscionable clauses is not
persuasive because it does not consider whether severance of the judicial
review provision vitiates the parties' consent. After discussing the
California cases, the court ultimately fell back on equity, citing Little for
the proposition that in deciding whether to sever, courts should look to
the overall "interests of justice. ' , 22 The Ninth Circuit then held that "the
offending clauses must, in the interests of justice, be severed from the
remainder of the contract." 21
It is not difficult to agree that an arbitration agreement should
probably not be invalidated seven years after the award issued, during
which time the award was repeatedly affirmed after court review,
remand, and more review. However, there was perhaps a better way to
deal with Kyocera's assertion that there was no valid consent to the
underlying arbitration because its consent to arbitrate depended upon
expanded judicial review of any award. The Ninth Circuit's en banc
panel could have pointed out that since appellate courts had upheld the
arbitration award under both the narrow and the broader grounds for
review, Kyocera had suffered no harm. Although the en banc panel itself
did not review the award on the merits, Kyocera could not argue that the
clause guaranteed en banc review, because an en banc hearing only
occurs if a24majority of circuit judges vote to order such a hearing or
rehearing. 1
On the other hand, by treating severance of the expanded judicial
review provision as though it were parallel to a situation where a clause
was unconscionable, the Ninth Circuit does not persuade, because the
unconscionable clauses are not analogous; they are one-sided and do not
necessarily affect the parties' consent to the underlying agreement to
arbitrate. Moreover, it remains unclear whether other federal courts or
even other California courts will use severance as a way to save an
arbitral award if expanded judicial review is rejected. Instead, courts
may focus on the consent of the parties and find, like the Crowell court,
that there was no consent to the arbitration agreement without the
expanded judicial review agreed upon by the parties. Therefore, if
parties know they want the arbitration agreement or award to be valid
even if the provisions for expanded judicial review are not enforced, they
should specifically state in their arbitration agreement that they still agree
122. 341 F.3d at 1001 (citing Little, 29 Cal. 4th at 1074).
123.

Id. at 1002.

124. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2003).
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to arbitrate even if the expanded judicial review provisions are found to
be unenforceable. 25 On the other hand, if their consent to arbitrate
depends upon the availability of expanded judicial review, they should
state that the arbitration agreement is invalid if the expanded judicial
review provisions are found to be unenforceable.
A second problem for domestic enforcement is that parties who seek
expanded judicial review need to be sure that they have proper
jurisdiction to be heard in a federal court that permits such review,
particularly if they are in a state where states courts have either denied
judicial review on the merits, or have not made that decision and could
go either way. Parties cannot automatically go into federal court under
the FAA. Although the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law, it26
does not provide a basis for independent federal question jurisdiction.
Thus, parties must have some independent basis for federal jurisdiction,
such as diversity.
Assume the parties have arbitrated in Texas and have included an
expanded judicial review clause in their arbitration agreement. If there is
a basis for federal court jurisdiction, the federal district courts, being part
of the Fifth Circuit, would enforce the provision for expanded judicial
review. However, if there is no jurisdictional basis for getting into
federal court, enforcement can only be had in state court. 12 If the parties
end up in state court in Texas, questions may arise as to whether the
FAA or Texas arbitration law applies to the agreement, and if the FAA
applies, whether the Texas state court will permit expanded judicial
review. 128

125. See Ronald M. Greenberg, Uncertain Appeal: Both Opponents and Advocates of Expanded
Judicial Review of Arbitration Decisions Invoke the Intent of the FederalArbitration Act, 25 L.A.
LAw. 35, 41 (2002) (advising that parties who now have agreements for arbitration that contain an
enhanced judicial review provision should, if they still want arbitration in the event the judicial
review provision is found unenforceable, so specify in an amendment to their arbitration
agreements).
126. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
("Section 4 [of the FAA] provides for an order compelling arbitration only when the federal district
court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of
citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction before the order can issue.").
127. See id. at 26 ("[E]nforcement of the Act is left in large part to state courts .... ).
128. It appears that the question of expanded judicial review has not been decided by the Texas
Supreme Court. In Mariner Financial Group Inc. v. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30, 40 (Tex. 2002), in a
concurring opinion in which three justices joined, Justice Owen noted that "[it is not at all clear
whether parties can, by their agreement, expand the standards for judicial review of arbitral awards
that are specified in section 10(a) of the FAA." One Texas Court of Appeals case, however,
indicated that if there were an express provision in the arbitration agreement providing for expanded
judicial review, such provision would apply rather than 'the FAA's default standard." Tanox, Inc. v.
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Folded, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244, 252 (Tex. App. 2003).

HeinOnline -- 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 452 2003-2004

2004]

CAN PARTIES TELL COURTS WHAT TO

DO?

As to the question of whether the FAA or Texas law applies to the
agreement, if the parties clearly stated that the FAA applies to their
arbitration agreement and the basic contract "evidenc[es] a transaction
involving commerce," 129 a court should apply the FAA. If parties did not
state any governing law, the FAA may nonetheless apply, again
assuming the transaction involved commerce. 30 The phrase "involving
commerce" has been broadly construed, and would probably cover most
commercial contracts.' 3 1 On the other hand, if the parties have agreed
132
that Texas law governs the contract, then the Texas Arbitration Act,
rather than the FAA, may govern' 33 and the Texas court would have to
decide whether the Texas Arbitration Act permits expanded judicial
review.
If the FAA, rather than Texas law, applied, but the case was
determined in state court, would the Texas court feel bound by the Fifth
Circuit's decision to permit expanded judicial review? Or could it
consider the question of expanded judicial review as an independent
interpreter of federal law? With respect to the Fifth Circuit's holding,
Texas courts, like many state courts, do not consider decisions on federal
law by federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, as
35
binding on them. 134 Rather, these decisions are only persuasive.
Where the federal appellate courts are divided, then a Texas court, like
most state courts, may consider itself free to make its own

129. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
130. There may be a question as to whether § 10 of the FAA, which provides the grounds for
judicial review, applies in state court. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, FederalArbitration
Act Preemption, 79 Indiana L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
131. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) (interpreting
"involving commerce" of section 2 of the FAA as implementing Congress's intent "to exercise [its]
commerce power to the full"). See also In re L & L Kepwood Assoc., 9 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Tex.
1999) (stating that the FAA applied to "any contract affecting commerce, as far as the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution will reach").
132. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001-171.098 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2001).
133. See Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
470 (1989) ("[Alpplication of the California statute is not pre-empted by the [FAA] in a case where
the parties have agreed that their arbitration agreement will be governed by the law of California.").
For a discussion of FAA preemption generally, see Drahozal, supra note 130.
134. See, e.g., J.M. Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe Energy Resources, 871 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.
1994) ("Although a decision of a federal court, other than the Supreme Court, may be persuasive in a
state court on a federal matter, it is, nevertheless, not binding."). For a good discussion of the
standards various state courts use to interpret and apply federal law, see Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing
into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal
Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1999).
135. See Lee M. Bass, nc. v. Shell Western E & P, 957 S.W.2d 159, 162 n.4 (Tex. App. 1997)
("Although we agree .. . that we are not bound by federal precedent, such precedent may be
persuasive.")
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determination. 36 Because a Texas court would not see itself as bound by
the Fifth Circuit's holding, it could interpret the FAA similarly to the
way the Tenth Circuit did-that is, to reject expanded judicial review.
Moreover, the Texas court might also determine that the question of
whether to grant expanded judicial review was a procedural question. In
that case, even though the FAA would govern substantive legal issues,
the court would apply the Texas Arbitration Act to the question of
expanded judicial review, since this issue38 was procedural.1 37 It could,
therefore, deny expanded judicial review.1
Thus, the question of whether the parties' agreement for expanded
judicial review will be respected by a court will depend on a number of
factors. First, it will depend on whether enforcement is sought in a
federal court within one of the federal circuits that have permitted
expanded review. If the award will be not reviewed in federal court, but
in a state court under state law, the question is how the state court will
decide the issue under state arbitration law. If review of the award is in
state court but under the FAA, the decision whether to permit expanded
review may well depend on the state court's interpretation of federal law,
or on its determination that a provision for expanded review is
procedural and thus determined by state procedural law. All of these
various possibilities suggest that parties should try to clearly provide in
their agreement whether state or federal law applies, and that they should
try to ascertain in advance whether there will be jurisdiction to seek
review in a court which permits expanded judicial review.
A third problem concerning expanded judicial review involves the
permissive character of the venue provisions of the FAA. 139 Assume the
parties, who have agreed to expanded review and meet the jurisdictional
requirements of the federal court, hold their arbitration in Texas, which is
136. See Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 336 P.2d 521, 524 (Cal. 1959), rev'd on
other grounds, 362 U.S. 628 (1960) ("Where lower federal court precedents are divided or lacking,
state courts must necessarily make an independent determination of federal law."); Zeigler, supra
note 134, at 1154 ("Most state courts facing [divided opinions in lower federal courts] consider
themselves free to make their own independent determination.").
137. See Brooks v. Pep Boys Auto. Supercenters, 104 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App. 2003)
("Even when applying the FAA, however, a Texas court must apply Texas procedural law and not
federal procedural law.").
138. Presumably the state court could, based on the substantive-procedural distinction, refuse to
apply an expanded judicial review provision even if the Supreme Court would hold such provisions
enforceable as federal procedural law. But there is language in Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), suggesting that the FAA represents "a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary," so it is not entirely clear that state courts can
apply state procedural law in FAA cases, id. at 24.
139. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2000).
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in the Fifth Circuit. When the award is granted, the winning party, who
suspects the award might be overturned under expanded review, races
back to confirm the award in his home state, which is in the Tenth
Circuit. The award is then confirmed under narrow standards, since
courts following the Tenth Circuit's decision will not permit expanded
review.
The party's act of going to a state other than the site of the arbitration
for a confirmation order does not violate the venue provisions of FAA,
even though section 9 appears to limit venue. That section states that,
unless the parties have named a specific court, "application [for
confirmation] may be made to the United States court in and for the
district within which such award was made." 140 However, the Supreme
Court made clear in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction
Co. 141that the venue provisions of the FAA are permissive. 142 It found
that the intent of Congress was to liberalize venue provisions by
expanding them and that Congress did not intend to foreclose suit in
locations which would otherwise be considered a proper venue, such as
the residence of the defendant. 43 The winning party could thus confirm
in his home district, under a narrower standard than the parties agreed to.
He takes the risk, however, that a district court that would refuse to apply
the broader standard of review might invalidate the underlying
arbitration agreement and vacate the award because the parties had not
agreed to arbitrate except with expanded judicial review. The losing
party, who would generally want broader judicial review in order to
expand his chance that the award could be overturned, would probably
move to vacate the award in the Texas court, but could conceivably
(assuming proper venue), move to vacate in a jurisdiction that denies
expanded judicial review, in the hope that the entire agreement would be
vacated.
To deal with the permissive venue problem, parties should draft an
arbitration agreement that provides that the party will only seek to
confirm, vacate, modify, or correct the award in the jurisdiction where
140. Id. § 9. Similarly, section 10(a), governing motions to vacate arbitration awards, provides
that "the United States court in and for the district wherein the [arbitration] award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration [in any of five
enumerated situations]." Section 11, on modification or correction, provides that "the United States
court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration."
141. 529 U.S. 193 (2000).
142. Id. at 195.
143. See id. at 200 (stating that Congress made no suggestion textually or otherwise that the
venue provisions foreclosed suit where the defendant resided).
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the arbitration is held. Further, assuming there is federal jurisdiction, the
parties should include a provision that any such action will only be
brought in federal court.
IV. COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

In an arbitration that takes place in the United States between a
foreign party and a U.S. party, the U.S. party, if it wins the arbitration,
may need to go to the foreign jurisdiction where the opposing party's
assets are located to enforce the award. At the same time, the losing
party may bring an action to vacate the award in the United States. This
Part will look at some of the complexities of international enforcement of
arbitral awards and will consider some of the problems with trying to
enforce an award internationally when the parties have sought expanded
judicial review.
A. Groundsfor Non-Enforcement under the New York Convention
The place where the U.S. party will bring an enforcement action is
likely to be a Contracting State under the Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("the New York Convention"
or "the Convention"), 144 which has been adopted by most trading nations.
It is important, therefore, to focus on the Convention in order to
understand the framework it provides for the international enforcement
of arbitration awards.
The goal of the Convention is to make arbitration awards easily
enforceable internationally. 145 The Convention requires Contracting
States to recognize non-domestic arbitral awards as binding and to
enforce them without imposing more onerous conditions than are
imposed on domestic awards. 14 6 The Convention then provides seven
different grounds which permit the enforcing court, in its discretion, to
refuse recognition and enforcement. 147 The grounds for non-enforcement
144. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The New York Convention has been
adopted by 134 countries. UNCITRAL Website, http://www.uncitral.org. The Inter-American
Arbitration Convention, Jan. 30, 1975, I.L.M. 336, has a similar enforcement scheme.
145. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) (stating that the
Convention's goal is to encourage international recognition and enforcement).
146. The New York Convention, supra note 143, art. I, III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
38, 40.
147. Article V provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:

HeinOnline -- 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 456 2003-2004

2004]

CAN PARTIES TELL COURTS WHAT TO

DO?

are narrow. They do not permit non-enforcement for errors of fact or
law, because the merits of an arbitral award are not subject to review.
Rather, enforcement may be denied for deficiencies in the fairness of the
process, the validity of the agreement, the scope of the arbitration, and
the arbitrability of the subject matter, or if enforcement of the award
would contravene the public policy of the enforcing nation. If none of
the grounds for non-enforcement is present, the Contracting State "shall
148
There is thus
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
149 them."'
enforcement.
of
favor
in
presumption
strong
a
Even though the narrow bases for refusal to enforce are meant to
encourage and harmonize international enforcement, the specific
statutory grounds are not completely independent of local law. 5 °
Perhaps the strongest example of interaction with local law is found in
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable
to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition of enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
Id. art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40-42.
148. Id. art. I,21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
149. Indeed, the ease with which enforcement of awards is obtained is considered one of the
major advantages of international commercial arbitration. See COE, supra note 9, at 61 ("[B]ecause
the grounds for declining enforcement tend to be narrowly construed, awards enjoy predictable
enforceability. Judgments, by contrast, are subject to no similar global regime, thus making
arbitration relatively advantageous in a critical respect."); RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 12 (2000) ("Enforcement under the New

York Convention creates an advantage of arbitration over litigation because of the absence of a
similar universal international convention covering litigation judgments.").
150. Under the New York Convention, local law can determine incapacity of the parties, validity
of the agreement, proper notice, proper composition of the arbitral authority, the proper arbitral
procedure, and vacatur. The New York Convention, supra note 143, art. V(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2520,
330 U.N.T.S. at 40-42.
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Article V(1)(e), which provides in pertinent part that recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused if the award has been set aside
"by a competent authority in the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made."' 51 Thus, if the arbitration loser can
persuade a court at the place of arbitration to vacate the award based on
that jurisdiction's domestic law, he can then come into the enforcing
jurisdiction, establish that the award has been set aside by the courts in
the rendering jurisdiction, and thereby most likely prevent the winner
from enforcing the award.152
It is important to note that the Convention does not provide a court
with the authority to vacate or set aside a foreign arbitral award. 53 The
court can refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign award under the
Convention, but that is not the same as annulling or setting aside the
award, which is a procedure reserved for the court in the jurisdiction
where the award was made. 154 The difference lies in the consequences of
the two proceedings. 155 Denial of enforcement does not make the award

151. Note that while theoretically, "under the law of which, that award was made" could lead to
a law of a different jurisdiction than that of the seat of the arbitration, this would rarely be the case.
See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997)
(acknowledging that an award could be rendered under the arbitral law of a state other than the state
where the arbitration is held, but commenting that "[t]his situation may be so rare as to be a 'dead
letter"') It is generally agreed that the law referred to here is the procedural law, not the substantive
law, and the procedural law is almost always the law of the seat of the arbitration. See Int'l Standard
Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 177-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing several foreign court decisions). Also, although the clause "where the award
was made" could mean where signed, or where arbitrators met for some of the hearings, it is
generally agreed to mean the arbitral situs. See BORN, supra note 85, at 760-61 (discussing various
definitions of "made"). For simplicity's sake, in this Article this clause will be referred to as
meaning the seat of the arbitration, or the jurisdiction where the arbitration took place (which will be
assumed to be the same).
152. However, the loser is not assured of this result since Article V states that the enforcing
court "may" refuse enforcement on the grounds listed, not that it "shall" do so. Some courts have
enforced awards which were previously annulled by courts in the place of arbitration. See infra text
accompanying notes 162-69.
153. In Toys "R" Us, 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997), the court noted that "many commentators and
foreign courts have concluded that an action to set aside an award can be brought only under the
domestic law of the arbitral forum, and can never be made under the Convention." Id. at 22. The
only action permitted a court with respect to a foreign arbitral award under the Convention is to
recognize the award, and enforce it, or refuse to do so. Id.
154. As commentators have noted, "grounds of annulment are conceptually and jurisdictionally
distinct from grounds of nonrecognition or nonenforcement." Ray Y. Chan, The Enforceability of
Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States: A Critique of Chromalloy, 17 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 141, 160 (1999).
155. Another difference is that the grounds for vacating an award are determined by the
domestic law of the country where the arbitration was held. Grounds for denial of enforcement are
limited to those set forth in the Convention. ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK
ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 265 (1981).
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void. 5 6 If assets of the losing party are available in more than one
jurisdiction, the winning party can seek to enforce the foreign award in a
second jurisdiction if the first jurisdiction fails to enforce. 157 The only
place an award may be set aside or vacated, according to the Convention,
is in the place where it was made. 158 The traditional view of an annulled
award is that once it is set aside, it no longer exists and is not capable of
being enforced anywhere. 59 The award certainly ceases to have any
legal effect in the jurisdiction which annulled it. 16° Thus, if an award is
made in the United States, even if it is considered a non-domestic award,
the American court can set aside or vacate that award under domestic law
and it will have no further legal effect in the United States. 161 However,
as will be discussed, some courts have enforced
62 awards even though they
have been vacated at the place of arbitration.1
Thus, although the grounds for non-enforcement are quite narrow
under the Convention, Article V(1)(e) permits vacatur under local law,
which then becomes a basis for non-enforcement. This creates 163a
loophole that could greatly expand the grounds for non-enforcement.
156. See BORN, supra note 85, at 774 ("[S]ignificantly different consequences may flow from:
(i) a national court's refusal to enforce an international arbitral award, and (ii) a national court's
decision setting aside or vacating the award ....
If an award is denied recognition in a national
court, it nonetheless remains a 'binding' award. It can be taken to other jurisdictions, and efforts can
be made to enforce it anew.").
157. Id.
158. Theoretically, under the New York Convention, it can also be set aside in the country, the
(procedural) law of which governed the arbitration. The New York Convention, supra note 144, art.
V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42. Although the language of Article V(l)(e) could
theoretically lead to a law of a different jurisdiction than that of the seat of the arbitration, this would
rarely be the case. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
159. Albert Jan van den Berg, Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS JUDICIALIZATION AND
UNIFORMITY 133, 137 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1994).
160. See BORN, supra note 85, at 774 ("If an award is 'vacated' or 'annulled,' then it ceases to
have legal effect (at least under the laws of the state where it was vacated) .... ").
161. A non-domestic award is one which is subject to the Convention not because made abroad,
but because a foreign law applies or because one or more of the parties has their principal place of
business in a foreign country. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir.
1983). In the Toys "R" Us case, 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997), the arbitration was between an
American company and a Kuwaiti company, and the award was made in the U.S. The winning
party, the Kuwaiti company, was permitted to move to confirm the award under the Convention
because the award was non-domestic, based on the location of one of the parties in Kuwait and
because the contract involved performance in the Middle East. Toys "R" Us was permitted to crossmove to vacate the award under the FAA because the award was made in the U.S. Id. at 18.
However, there is some authority for the position that only Article V grounds are available in an
action in the arbitral situs to vacate a non-domestic award. BORN, supra note 85, at 727-28.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 147-51.
163. Toys "R" Us, 126 F.3d at 22. The Toys "R" Us court cited W. Laurence Craig, Some
Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30
TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (1995) for this point. "What the Convention did not do... was provide any
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If, for example, an award is vacated on a ground of local law that would
not be a valid ground to prevent enforcement under the Convention, the
award in most cases will still not be enforced because it was vacated in
the place where made. Nonetheless, the Convention's provisions make
possible the enforcement of a vacated award. First, Article V(1)(e) states
that enforcing courts "may" deny enforcement of a vacated award,
thereby appearing to allow discretion to enforce an award even if it has
been set aside in the place where it was made.' 64 Second, Article VII
provides that the provisions of the Convention "shall not ... deprive any
interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral
award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties
of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.' 65 This
clause, referred to as the "more favorable right" provision, allows a party
to take advantage of any local law of the enforcing jurisdiction that
would provide a greater right to enforcement than the rendering state.
Although it is not clear that the Convention drafters intended this
provision to permit the enforcement of an annulled award, commentators
have noted that nothing in the language appears to preclude this
interpretation. 166

international mechanism to insure the validity of the award where rendered. This was left to the
provisions of local law. The Convention provides no restraint whatsoever on the control functions of
local courts at the seat of arbitration." Id. The Toys "R" Us court concluded that
the Convention mandates very different regimes for the review of arbitral awards (1) in
the state in which, or under the law of which, the award was made, and (2) in other states
The Convention specifically
where recognition and enforcement are sought.
contemplates that the state in which, or under the law of which, the award is made, will
be free to set aside or modify an award in accordance with its domestic arbitral law and
its full panoply of express and implied grounds for relief... However, the Convention is
equally clear that when an action for enforcement is brought in a foreign state, the state
may refuse to enforce the award only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of
the Convention.
Id. at 23.
164. The New York Convention, supra note 144, art. V(l)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 42.
165. Id. art. VII(l), 21 U.S.T. at 2520-21,330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
166. Gary H. Sampliner, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards after Annulment in their
Country of Origin, II MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 22, 22 (1996). A U.S. district court, in In re
Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996), enforced an award that had been vacated
by the Egyptian Court of Appeal. Other U.S. courts have refused to enforce vacated awards. See
Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); Spier v. Calzaturifcio
Technic, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), reargument denied, 77 F. Supp. 2d 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). For further discussion of this issue, see generally Chan, supra note 154;
Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An Economic
Approach, II AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451 (2002); Georgios C. Petrochilos, Enforcing Awards
Annulled in their State of Origin under the New York Convention, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 856
(1999).
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In France, a number of annulled awards have been enforced.
France's national law governing international arbitrations lists only five
specific grounds on which an appeal can be brought against a decision
granting recognition or enforcement. 167 Vacatur of an award by the court
in the rendering state is not one of those grounds. Thus, the narrower
French grounds for appeal of an enforcement decision, and Article VII of
the Convention, provide a party whose award was vacated with the
opportunity nonetheless to use the more favorable French law to enforce
its award in France. France simply does not recognize the foreign
annulment of an award as a basis for non-enforcement, unless that
annulment was made168 on the basis of one of the grounds listed in the
French national law.
How then might this state of affairs affect an award that was vacated
on the merits in the United States, by an American court, under expanded
jurisdiction agreed to by the parties, or that was vacated because the
American court refused expanded jurisdiction, and invalidated the
arbitration agreement? The next sub-Part will discuss these issues, as
well as the issues arising in connection with awards confirmed after
expanded judicial review.

167. Article 1502 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
An appeal against the decision which shall confer recognition or enforcement shall be
open only in the following cases:
1. where the arbitrator has ruled upon the matter without an arbitration agreement or
where this agreement is null or has lapsed;
2. where the arbitration tribunal has been unlawfully constituted or a sole arbitrator
unlawfully appointed;
3. where the arbitrator has ruled upon the matter contrary to the assignment given to him;
4. where the adversarial principle has not been respected;
5. where the recognition or enforcement shall be contrary to public international order.
N.C.P.C. art. 1502 (Fr.).
168. See Cour de Cassation, Cass. le civ., Oct. 9, 1984, translatedin XI Y.B. COM. ARB. 484,
489-91 (1986) (holding that a judge cannot refuse enforcement when his own national legal system
permits it). The French ease in enforcing annulled awards has been strongly criticized, particularly
after a series of decisions in the case of Hilmarton v. OTV. An award made in Switzerland was
enforced in France, despite its annulment in Switzerland. Cour de Cassation, Mar. 23, 1994,
translated in XX Y.B. COM. ARB. 663, 664-65 (1995). After the annulment, a second award was
made in Switzerland to the party who had lost under the first award. That party's attempts to enforce
the award in France were at first successful in the lower courts, but were ultimately rejected by the
Cour de Cassation, which held that enforcement of the second award was barred by recognition of
the first award. Cour de Cassation, June 10, 1997, translatedin XXII Y.B. COM. ARB. 696, 697-98
(1997).
See generally Hamid G. Gharavi, Enforcing Set Aside Arbitral Awards: France's
Controversial Steps Beyond the New York Convention, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L & POL'Y 93 (1996)
(stating that an award may be enforced although set aside basis provided in Article IX).
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B. Treatment Under the New York Convention of Awards Which Have
Been Subjected to Expanded JudicialReview
If parties to an international arbitration held in the United States
chose expanded judicial review of an arbitrator's decision, certain
problems could arise in the enforcing jurisdiction. First, the parties
would normally be able to seek judicial review in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction, assuming one of them is from a foreign country.
However, if the parties are in a federal jurisdiction opposed to expanded
judicial review, or if the Supreme Court has in the meantime decided
against expanded judicial review, an American court asked to review an
award on the merits under the FAA could refuse to provide expanded
review and could, as in a domestic arbitration, decide to vacate the award
on the grounds that the underlying arbitration agreement was invalid.
The court's rationale would be that since the parties arguably would not
have consented to arbitration unless judicial review on the merits was
available, in the absence of the agreed-upon review, there was no valid
consent to arbitrate.
Given this result, assume the party in whose favor the award-now
vacated-had originally been made, nonetheless tried to enforce the
award in a foreign jurisdiction. It is unlikely that a foreign court would
enforce the award. It would probably find under the New York
Convention that it should not enforce the award because the agreement
was "not valid under the law to which the parties subjected it.' ' 169 Thus,
if parties choose expanded judicial review and an American court refuses
to grant it, and invalidates the agreement, they may end up having totally
wasted the effort of arbitrating.
A second kind of problem could arise if the American court grants
review on the merits and confirms the award. Assume the prevailing
party then seeks enforcement in the foreign jurisdiction where the losing
party's assets are located. It is possible that in the foreign court the
losing party would assert a right of appeal on the merits based on a
clause in the arbitration agreement, which provided that the arbitral
award was final and binding on both parties, "except that errors of law
shall be subject to appeal."'' 70 This kind of clause could subject the
169. The New York Convention, supra note 144, art. V(l)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 40.
170. See the arbitration clause used in Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d
993, 995 (5th Cir. 1995). Another arbitration clause which might be interpreted as applying to the
enforcing court as well as the court in the rendering state is the following one from the agreement in
Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), an early
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parties to yet another appeal on the merits before the enforcing court.'7 1
Even though most foreign courts that are subject to the New York
Convention would probably not agree to review the award on the
merits, 72 the assets could be located in a state that has not adopted the
Convention, or one that might be persuaded to follow the parties'
agreement. Parties that choose expanded review should, therefore, be
careful to draft a clause that limits any judicial review to the court in the
state where the award was made. The clause used in the agreement at
issue in LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.173 would accomplish
this purpose:
The arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state the bases of
the award and include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
may enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or
by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall
vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds
referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators'
findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence,
or (iii) where
74
the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous. 1

By specifically naming the situs court as the court with expanded
jurisdiction, parties can avoid the risk that the enforcing court would find
that the agreement granted it expanded review on the merits at the
enforcing stage. It is important to be clear on this point because the
foreign enforcing court, which is unlikely to grant expanded review,
example where the district court upheld the provision and reviewed the award in accordance with the
parties' expressed intent:
Upon an application to the court for an order confirming said award, the court shall have
the power to review (1) whether the findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator are, on the
entire record of said arbitration proceedings, supported by substantial evidence, and (2)
whether as a matter of law based on said findings of fact the award should be affirmed,
modified or vacated. Upon such determination, judgment shall be entered in favor of
either party considered therewith.
Id. at 242.
171. See Younger, supra note 5, at 261 ("A judicial review clause may subject United States
parties to substantive appeals in foreign courts.").
172. Albert Jan van den Berg notes that:
It is a generally accepted interpretation of the Convention that the court before which the
enforcement of the foreign award is sought may not review the merits of the award. The
main reason is that the exhaustive list of grounds for refusal of enforcement enumerated
in Article V does not include a mistake of fact or law by the arbitrator.
JAN VAN DEN BERG, supra note 155, at 269.

173. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded in part,341 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2003).
174. Id. at 887.
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could nonetheless refuse to enforce the award on validity grounds. As in
the first example above, the foreign court could find that if the parties
had known that either the situs court or the enforcing court would not
It
review for errors of law, they would not have consented to arbitration.
175
might therefore hold that there was no valid consent to arbitrate.
A third kind of problem could arise if the American court granted
review on the merits and then vacated the award on the merits. The
losing party on appeal, in whose favor the arbitration award had been
granted, could nonetheless seek to enforce the award. If it was able to
bring the action in France or a country with similar rules, such as
Germany, it might succeed in obtaining enforcement, even though the
award was vacated in the United States, because it was not vacated on
one of the narrow grounds for non-enforcement permitted by French or
German law. 176 Thus, choosing expanded review on the merits would
not be prudent for a party who has assets in France, Germany, or a
country with similar arbitration laws. Even if the award was an aberrant
one vacated under expanded judicial review because it was in violation
of applicable law, the judicial safety net of the court at the situs might
not protect a party against enforcement in certain jurisdictions.
If expanded judicial review is desired by the parties, but assets of at
least one of the parties are located in a jurisdiction likely to enforce an
award set aside on the merits, the parties should probably reconsider their
decision to seek expanded review. If they want to go forward, however,
it might be prudent to put into the arbitration clause an agreement that
neither party will seek to enforce an award that has been vacated on the
merits. While this might not effectively protect the party opposing
enforcement, it would at least provide that party with an argument
against enforcement on public policy grounds-i.e., 'that it is against
public policy for the enforcing court to use its power to enforce an award
presented for enforcement in willful and deliberate breach of the
petitioner's promise not to seek enforcement.
175. See Knull & Rubins, supra note 10, at 546-47 ("The potential invalidity of such clauses
[for expanded judicial review] in Europe raises the possibility that a court there could find the entire
agreement to arbitrate invalid, on the ground that the parties would not have made the agreement had
they known the grounds for review would be limited.").
176. Laurence Franc notes that Article 1507 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure "rejects
review on the merits of arbitral awards and the decisional French law has never allowed review of
awards on the merits." ContractualModification of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, supra note
10, at 219. He further notes that if an award was vacated on the merits in the United States, "such an
award could be enforced in France even though set aside in the United States on error of law or
fact." Id. at 223. Like French law, German arbitration law provides a definite and exclusive list of
grounds on which an award may be challenged. See Hans Smit & Vratislav Pechota, National
Arbitration Laws, GER B(2)-15 (2002).
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As can be seen from these various examples, there are a number of
practical problems relating to the international enforcement of awards
subject to expanded judicial review. Even if the uncertainty of the law in
the United States is resolved by a Supreme Court decision permitting
expanded judicial review, the problems of enforcing such awards
internationally will remain.
V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the difficulty in persuading a court to set aside an arbitration
award that is plainly wrong has caused some parties to seek a safety
mechanism against maverick arbitral decisions by agreeing to judicial
review of an arbitral award on the facts, the law, or both. Legal and
policy reasons on the whole seem stronger for permitting rather than
refusing expanded judicial review if the parties want it. Congress' intent
in enacting the FAA was to permit parties' arbitration agreements to be
enforced according to their terms, like any other contract. 177 Moreover,
if parties who want this safety net are denied it,. they will simply impose
the full burden of their disputes on the courts. Expanded judicial review
may not, however, be the best choice for parties at-the present time. The
current uncertainty in the United States of whether courts will agree to
provide such review, the potentially different results depending on
whether parties end up in state or federal court, as well as the uncertain
reception internationally of awards which have been reviewed on the
facts or the law, make expanded judicial review a choice which must be
made carefully, if at all, in order to avoid ending up with a result that
could completely undercut the safety net the parties sought.

177. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989) (stating that passage of the Act "was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional
desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered" and that "[the Act] requires courts to
enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their
terms").

HeinOnline -- 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 465 2003-2004

HeinOnline -- 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 466 2003-2004

